highly populated India, only 27.8 percent of people lived in urban areas in 2000. 7 And in some African countries the urban population is an even smaller proportion; for Ethiopia the proportion of urban dwellers was only 15.9 percent.
Legal Uncertainty
To simplify, it is useful to think of agricultural land as the most important development topic so far as real estate is concerned. Yet, in the developing world, agricultural land ownership is often shrouded in legal uncertainty: "In many countries, especially in Africa, … often more than 90 percent of land remains outside the existing legal system." 9 Moreover, in cities the legal situation is often even more uncertain and problematic because social norms and bonds of tradition are much looser than in the less rapidly changing countryside. De Soto's study of Peru led him to the conclusion that "more than 90 percent of rural and half of urban property rights in Peru are not protected by formalized titles-that is, they are 'informal.'" 10 African and Asian developing countries present a similar problem: "More than 50 percent of the peri-urban population in Africa and more than 40 percent in Asia live under informal tenure and therefore have highly insecure land rights."
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In rural areas, it is not just the livelihood of those who work the land that is at risk. Legal insecurity has broader costs to the economy. For example, where land ownership is not recorded in a land registry, farmers often have to pay for fences, trees, and other boundary markers because there is no other way of knowing where land boundaries begin and end. These capital investments involve costs not just to the farmer person's land to another's is that a different dog barks. 12 Disputes resulting in litigation consume real resources of the disputants and of the state.
The economic and financial consequences of legal uncertainty are profound. The farmer cannot mortgage his property where no legal infrastructure protects his property and prescribes its metes and bounds. And if he cannot mortgage his property, he cannot borrow to improve his property, or to buy more land, or to start a new business. Of course, even with title, he may still be unable to borrow against the land if his property is so small that formal sector lenders have no incentive to lend the commensurately small sums involved. Moreover, social norms in indigenous areas may work against putting land up as collateral because nonpayment may result in transfer of the land to outsiders.
13
Investment in improving land, whether in drainage, irrigation or new types of crops, is important to output, productivity and the environment. Increasing legal certainty through titling also increases investment in improving the land, leading to higher agricultural production:
Farmers in Thailand with title invested so much more in their land that their output was 14-25 percent higher than those working untitled land of the same quality. In Vietnam rural households with a document assigning clear rights of control and disposition commit 7.5 percent more land to crops requiring a greater initial outlay and yielding returns after several years than households without documentation. In Peru almost half those with title to their property in Lima's squatter settlements have invested in improvements, compared with 13 percent of those without title." 14 Moreover, where greater legal certainty has been created in developing country land markets, prices for land increase. The "value of rural land in Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand increases by anywhere from 43 percent to 81 percent after being titled." 15 Though higher land prices may be thought to create equity issues, these 4 higher prices are a good measure of the value of legal certainty created by titling. And the higher prices in turn create the collateral base for obtaining credit to improve the land, in turn leading to even higher prices. 16 Creating security of title thus has a two-part reinforcing effect. Not only does it reinforce the incentive to invest in land, but it also creates the wherewithal to be able to do so by increasing the ability to borrow the requisite funds:
Farmers with secure title in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, and Thailand obtain larger loans on better terms than those without it. In Thailand farms with title borrowed anywhere from 50 percent to five times more from banks and other institutional lenders than farmers with land identical but without title. Similarly, the ability to start a business with funds obtained from mortgaging real estate is especially important, as developed country experience shows: "In the United
States, up to 70% of the credit that new businesses receive comes from using formal titles as collateral for mortgages."
18
Without legal certainty as to ownership, transferability of land is equally uncertain. Without legal certainty as to transferability, a market in land is difficult to create. And hence the normal function of land markets in moving land into more efficient and productive hands is likely to be slow or nonexistent.
Lack of legal certainty also makes it difficult for an ambitious farm worker to become a farm owner. The result is that much land in developing countries is farmed by rental tenants. These tenants often enter into sharecropping agreements, in which the owner-who may be a distant city dweller-and the tenant share the crops (or their proceeds not usually as efficient as farms operated by a resident owner. 19 Thus, lack of legal certainty is not only a barrier to social and economic progress for the poor, but it also results in less than optimal agricultural production, a particularly serious economic problem in a developing economy still heavily focused on agriculture.
Finally, legal uncertainty is not even good for the environment (contrary to the primitive notion that measures taken to increase agricultural output necessarily harm the environment). For example, a major cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is the absence of property rights, which leads to short-term strategies for rapid exploitation of land. 20 A study of 53 countries concluded that "a modest improvement in the protection of property rights could reduce the rate of deforestation by as much as one-third." 21 But the correlation between greater security for property rights and sounder environmental practices is not limited to the deforestation example. Another study showed that "Ethiopian farmers are less likely to plant trees and build terraces to protect against erosion-and more likely to increase the use of fertilizer and herbicides-if their rights to land are insecure."
22
In short, steady and sustainable economic development in the rural sector depends upon creating legal certainty with respect to ownership and transferability of land.
Urban Real Estate
Legal uncertainty as to ownership in cities is even more serious for economic development. This is true not just for business premises but also for house and apartment In addition to the points comparable to rural areas with regard to the inability to borrow on the equity of a residence to start a business and to transferability issues in trying to buy or sell residences, the economic activities of city dwellers may be circumscribed. For example, the ever-present possibility of seizure or dispossession that arises through an inability to assert legal rights of ownership leads to the need for at least one family member to remain at home to protect the residence. Many are therefore forced to find some way of earning money at home. 26 Often, of course, this means that women cannot enter the mainstream labor force and improve their economic position. Beyond the social effects, the economic result is that a large portion of the population is not able to make a reasonable economic contribution through their work. Moreover, the lack of opportunity for the improvement of skills through on-the-job experience and training restricts the economic development of the community. In the case of land, the situation may not be a problem in a traditional community untroubled by outsiders. But rising population in many developing countries has strained even these communities as more and more people seek to survive and better themselves economically on the same amount of land. But even more disturbing to certainty than the multiplying of the local population is the intrusion of outsiders, whether they be wealthy merchants who seek land as an investment or entrepreneurial land companies or even urban and foreign settlers. An illustration is the case of Kenya in the 1930s, where "land hunger was pronounced due to white settlement" and as a result modern land legal systems were demanded and introduced, even though titling and land registration did not become systematic until the 1950s.
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Economists studying the evolution from traditional communal land arrangements to legal protection have explained the latter as "endogenously" created by the interaction of supply and demand. What is meant is that the new legal system for land was not created because some domestic or international civil servant thought it would be a good idea.
Rather, the demand from ordinary people for protection and certainty increased as land pressure and resulting disputes grew. In turn, the state (meaning politicians seeking votes or authoritarian rulers seeking popular support) invested in a legal system for land. 
Issues in Titling
The most common issues concerning titling involve finding a way to give existing "owners" actual titles. De Soto popularized the idea of titling in his 1989 and 2000
books. 33 But titling was a government response, even in the developing world, before
DeSoto wrote his two books. Titling was introduced successfully in the 1980s in Thailand. 34 A major titling effort in Ecuador beginning in 1993 was directed at urban areas.
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One of the problems in titling, especially in urban areas, is determining the identity of the actual owner who should be awarded the title. In the massive movement of people off the land into cities in the latter part of the twentieth century in the developing world, vast informal urban agglomerations grew up without effective governance and law. In Peru, De Soto's home country, a massive titling effort ran into difficulties in these informal areas due to conflicting claims to the same parcel of land.
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Titling is only half of the battle if the objective is to create economic development. The elimination of existing restrictions on free transferability of land is equally important. First, land, even if titled, cannot be used as a means of raising money for investment in the land, whether for improved productivity or for side commercial ventures, unless the land can be mortgaged. And mortgages will not be available unless foreclosure is possible, which means that the lender must be able to assume title to the land.
One study of Thailand found that the major benefit of titling was precisely the ability to borrow from formal financial institutions, rather than security of ownership as such. Access to credit was over three times greater on titled than untitled land. 37 the benefit of titling comes in large measure, at least in Thailand, from legal transferability.
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A political, and sometimes ideological, issue that sometimes arises in developing countries is that free transferability of land evokes an image of landless rural poor. The notion is that small farm owners will be duped or coerced into selling out. Indeed, market-oriented land reform involving free transferability is at odds with the ideology of land reform that in many countries earlier supported the breaking up of large estates in favor of landless peasants. At the same time, it must be recognized that these early land reform efforts were not only successful in breaking up large estates but sometimes increased output and productivity through transfer to individual farmer ownership. 39 In more policy-oriented terms, the fear is simply that transferability will lead to greater income inequality. Yet lack of transferability is likely to limit the economic development promise of titling efforts in the countryside. Moreover, transferability was shown, in a
World Bank study of Colombia, to "make a significant contribution to greater equalization of the operational structure of land holdings and, to a more limited extent, the ownership structure." 40 In short, "rental and sales markets were more effective in transferring land to poor but productive producers than was administrative land reform."
41
A different kind of problem arises from the hard-to-escape condition that titling involving free transferability must be based on the existence of a land registry. 42 It is only by land registration that a buyer can be sure to be dealing with the legal owner, that the land is free of legal encumbrances such as mortgages, and that the boundaries of the plot of land correspond to the seller's representations. A registration system must not only be 38 Feder and Feeney (1991 42 The United States does not use a land registration system but rather a system for the recordation of deeds and encumbrances such as mortgages. A Torrens land registration system was partially adopted in some states in the twentieth century, but even in those states land registration has not been a successful competitor with an already well-established recording system (supplemented by title insurance). Casner et al. (2000, p. 783-820) and Miceli et al. (2002) . Britain made a major move to a land registration system in 1925. Bostick (1987) . The reason land registration has not been successful in the United States has little relevance to developing countries, which would most probably find it even more difficult to introduce an American deed and mortgage recording system, which in practice requires not just qualified civil servants but also private lawyers (to interpret the result of title searches) and a title insurance system. created, but the existing owner has to know about the land registration process and be motivated to register. The result in Kenya has been that it is the larger farms with better access to markets that turn out to be the farms that are registered. 43 Titling costs money. It cannot function properly without the rest of the legal infrastructure that goes with it: A cadastral survey showing property boundaries and landmarks is indispensable. So too land registries are expensive to create and maintain. 44 More than just the mechanics of surveys and registries is involved. A competent administration of the system is needed. Accuracy and promptness are important:
In Mozambique there is a backlog of about 10,000 applications for land rights, which means long delays between receipt of an investment plan and eventual granting of the land right. In Cameroon the minimum amount of time it takes to register a plot is 15 months, and registration commonly takes between 2 and 7 years. In Peru the official adjudication process takes 43 months and 207 steps in 48 offices, although an expedited process is now being implemented in selected areas.
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Obviously middle-income countries are more likely than poorer countries to be able to afford the infrastructure and perhaps also to field a sufficiently competent bureaucracy to make land registration work smoothly. A further important factor is that the judiciary has to be educated in the new system and be ready to enforce these newly created formal rights. Land registration is thus an example of a situation where some economic development is require to generate the resources necessary for legal solutions that create the basis for further economic development. In short, legal development and economic development in such instances must necessarily advance hand in hand.
If the advantages that a developed legal system for land titling, registration and transferability are to be realized, especially with regard to enabling mortgage borrowing through the use of land as security, appropriate laws on mortgage security are necessary, though by no means sufficient. The judiciary must be prepared to foreclose in accordance with the statute. Otherwise, banks and other financial institutions will not lend. Among the problems that can arise, aside from corruption, is that judges may be reluctant to throw the poor off their land or out of their houses. And still another problem is that financial institutions may be unwilling to lend for other reasons. In Brazil, India, and Russia, macroeconomic instability and the resulting rampant inflation made the development of a mortgage market difficult. 46 In any case banks may be unwilling to lend to borrowers of small sums; capacity to pay and the costs of servicing small bank loans remain crucial to bank lending decisions. These legal techniques were restraints on alienation that kept land off the market.
Eventually, in an evolution that lasted some centuries, entail (which was an interest in land normally created, for example, in the use of strict settlement) was abolished. The gradual elimination of restraints on alienation in the developed world was accompanied by more rapid economic growth, and assured that that growth was enjoyed in the agricultural as well as in the commercial and emerging industrial economies. Some economic studies substantiate the importance of removing restraints on alienation.
52 For a general discussion on the gentry, see Tawney (1941) . 53 For a nontechnical explanation of strict settlement, see English and Saville (1983) farm has iconic importance. 63 A variety of economic factors lead to the conclusion that the owner-operated farm is not always the optimal form of farm enterprise. 64 Land rental has the social advantage of allowing people who would otherwise be farm employees or even unemployed to become independent farm operators. In fact, where the objective is to provide the poor with their own land, land rental has been shown to be more effective than land reform. 
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A number of countries do not recognize land rental contracts at all. 67 Often these prohibitions are part of a land reform program involving the breaking up of large estates, and the prohibition was motivated by a desire to assure that the recipients of the redistributed land actually farmed them. This is no doubt the motivation for the purported prohibition in land reform regulations of rental tenancy in India, which led to a much lower rate of even informal land tenancy.
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Some countries prohibit certain forms of rental contract; the most common is a prohibition on sharecropping, where the landlord and tenant share crop harvests (or the proceeds Recent decades have seen the gradual shedding in the developing world of restraints on sale and rental that were imposed by earlier governments of a revolutionary or socialist ideology and that sought thereby to reduce inequality in income and wealth.
The gradual lifting of these restraints on alienation appears in part to be the result of Hence, social norms and family pressures may work against land registration. This is especially true because even if a family patriarch or clan leader might want to recognize, through the land registration process itself, the rights and expectations of the rest of the members of the extended family or clan, it is almost impossible to see how that could be done without losing many of the benefits of land registration: If members of the extended family were to be listed as co-owners, the written agreement of all would be necessary to mortgage the property or to sell the land. The upshot is that for some people in the developing world, land registration creates more legal and economic uncertainty than it eliminates. An Anglo-American type of trust (or its civil law equivalents) might work, but the trust-which arose over the centuries in the evolution of English law-may not be available and in any event the institution of the trust evokes a culture distant from most traditional societies in the developing world.
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Another kind of problem that developed country lawyers might classify as a law 70 Platteau (2000, p. 152) . 71 According to Johnston (1988) , the trust was available under Roman law, and Helmholz and Zimmermann (1998) find equivalents of the trust have been worked out in some civil law countries. Kenyans who succeeded in having pasture lands registered in their own names on the ground that they would bring them into cultivation" whereas "their intent was not to exploit the land in question but just to use it as collateral in order to obtain loans from banks in Nairobi" to be used for personal purposes without intention of repayment but rather with the intent to allow the land to be foreclosed. 73 In peri-urban areas where wealthy city dwellers are intent on real estate development in nearby formerly agricultural areas, fraud and corruption in the titling process may lead the farm population to perceive titling as more of a threat than a benefit. The conclusion for agricultural land is that land registration may be an important stimulus to economic development, but its adoption is likely to be resisted by many people in the developing world who would ultimately benefit by the economic advantages it could bring over time. In the case of urban real estate, say houses or apartments, one can see that this property serves "both as insurance against uncertain It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that all communal ownership is so inefficient that it is an obstacle to economic development. The prime reason is that much communal property is not truly open access property. 81 The most common communal Another Look at History A short summary of the discussion thus far is that the process of moving to a market economy in land is likely to be evolutionary rather than purely technocratic. Legal transplants can help, but only if the legal infrastructure is in place and even then results are likely to be measured in most countries in years, if not decades. This conclusion is all the more important for the process of moving from communal to individual ownership.
Again the lessons of Northern Europe some centuries ago, especially the conflict involved in the enclosure movement, suggest that attitudes and practices involving something as fundamental as land are likely to take at least one or two generations to change.
Although communal land systems today unquestionably differ greatly from country to country, even within a region such as sub-Saharan Africa, the resemblance of the economic aspects of traditional communal tenure arrangements to the historical situation in Northern Europe prior to the enclosure movement is nevertheless remarkable.
Although the details in Northern Europe differed from country to country, the well- Strip farming had its disadvantages and its advantages. On the disadvantage side, the strips in England were often so small that plows could be used only in the lengthwise 82 Allen (1992, p. 27-28 Given the advantages of communal property arrangements and the political sensitivity of any changes that might threaten individual economic well-being and even survival, one policy implication is that the transition from communal ownership to individual ownership has to be handled carefully. country is not unrelated to the difficulties created by the land tenure conversion effort.
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Fortunately, alternatives exist permitting the upgrading of tenure security over time as opposed to a one-shot conversion from communal to pure individual ownership. An experiment along such gradualist lines was carried out in Namibia. 88 Similarly, Botswana has successfully used gradualism to make the transitions.
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Certainly a move from communal ownership, however much tempered by individual use rights, to full-fledged individual titles and land registration is likely to meet some resistance. One constraint that has sometimes stood in the way of thoroughgoing titling and registration reforms is a set of social norms that conflict with the individualistic philosophy of the reforms. One particular problem, for example, has been the difficulty of assuring women the right to participate in ownership and registration upon the death of a spouse, especially where the prior communal systems subordinated their rights to those of their husband or extended family.
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A different kind of problem arises in those countries such as China, Mexico, and Ethiopia in which collective ownership was imposed in the wake of revolutions. The consequence was that neither local governance nor social norms worked to ameliorate the negative economic effects of the resulting "communal" system. The negative consequences of such forced communalization can be found in the Mexican ejido system introduced in the 1920s and 1930s, and not fully reformed until 1992. 91 Under the earlier system investment fell, the work became more labor intensive, and even crop choice was biased toward short-term payoffs. 92 The reformed system provides for full privatization, including land registration and the ability to mortgage land, but at least in some parts of Mexico, farmers have been reluctant to take advantage of such titling, in part because "land taxes rise sharply upon privatization, 93 surely a counterproductive approach to improving productivity and farm incomes.
China has nonetheless used a gradualist approach, with good effect for productivity and output, by implementing, through the household responsibility system, evolution of land holdings toward a more efficient system despite the reluctance of local authorities who fear loss of flexibility and, no doubt in some cases, of opportunities for personal gain.
A further approach involves starting by giving official legal status to existing communal institutions. Colombia, for example, has introduced collective land titling for particular indigenous groups. 99 In Mozambique a 1997 statute recognized customary rights of individuals, but gave communities what amounts to titles and registration. This approach was a reaction to the circumstance that in Mozambique some 20 different customary systems were operating (which was one reason why giving land titles to individuals was beyond the fiscal and bureaucratic capacity of the country at the time).
And while the system does not provide the credit advantages of individual titling and registration, it does provide a system by which individuals can transfer their land and it also allows the community to negotiate with outsiders for the exploitation of natural resources.
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An increasing number of countries simply recognize in their formal legal systems the validity of individual rights under existing communal systems. This approach, which bows to the fiscal and bureaucratic difficulties of full-scale individual titling and registration, is only a small step in the direction of a market economy approach to economic development.
Nonetheless, formal legal recognition of individual rights to a plot in a larger tract of communal land may have some economic value. Indeed, as suggested earlier in this chapter, such recognition of individual rights already exists in many communal systems.
However, traditional communal law frequently gives elders or chiefs the power to reallocate some or all of a plot, where-for example-they conclude that the owners are not properly working the plot. Since naturally at least some neighbors want more land, the resulting pressures for reallocation cause current owners to be cautious, especially about taking part-time jobs off the farm because they fear it may lead to land being reallocated away from them. Since "greater involvement by rural households in the offfarm economy is widely recognized as a critical pre-condition for broad-based rural 99 Plant and Hvalkof (2001, p. 33-34) published by the Inter-American Development Bank. 100 Tanner (2002). development," 101 protecting farmers against reallocation through the formal legal system can assist national economic development. Though it is difficult to know the quantitative effect on labor supply of threatened land reallocation, we do know that comprehensive titling and registration has on average increased labor supply by households in Peru quite substantially.
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Encroaching Realities
The thrust of the foregoing discussion is that communal land systems need not be inefficient and therefore automatically in need of conversion to individual ownership. But 
